

CS489/689 Privacy, Cryptography, Network and Data Security

Differential Privacy – Part 2


Randomized Response (RR)




- Now we consider a mechanism with binary inputs and outputs, i.e., $M: \{0,1\} \rightarrow \{0,1\}$. This makes more sense in the local setting, where $x \in \{0,1\}$ and the outputs is $y \in \{0,1\}$.
- For example, *x* can be the answer to a yes/no question:
 - Have you voted for party X?
 - Have you tested positive for virus Y?
 - Have cheated in any assignment this term?
- Instead of reporting *x*, Alice follows the following process:



RR - Question




• Instead of reporting x, Alice follows the following process:




Q: compute these probabilities with an unbiased coin: Pr(y = 0 | x = 0) Pr(y = 1 | x = 0) Pr(y = 0 | x = 1) Pr(y = 1 | x = 1)

RR - Question



• Instead of reporting x, Alice follows the following process:



Q: compute these probabilities with an unbiased coin: Pr(y = 0 | x = 0) Pr(y = 1 | x = 0) Pr(y = 0 | x = 1) Pr(y = 1 | x = 1) **A**:

$$Pr(y = 0 | x = 0) = 0.75$$

$$Pr(y = 1 | x = 0) = 0.25$$

$$Pr(y = 0 | x = 1) = 0.25$$

$$Pr(y = 1 | x = 1) = 0.75$$


Randomized Response (RR)

Differential Privacy (local model, discrete outputs)

A mechanism $M: \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$ is ϵ -differentially private (ϵ -DP) if the following holds for all possible outputs $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ and all pairs of neighboring datasets $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}$:

 $\Pr(M(x) = y) \le \Pr(M(x') = y) e^{\epsilon}$

Q: what is the level of DP that RR provides?




Randomized Response (RR)


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


• More generally, we can have any probabilities p and 1 - p.




Q: what is the ϵ in this case?

• More generally, we can have any probabilities p and 1 - p.



- Even though it is hard to guess the x given y (unless p → 1 or 0), when multiple users report outputs we can get an estimate of the percentage of users that had x = 1.
- Assume there are *n* users reporting values, and a fraction p_0 have x = 0, while a fraction $p_1 = 1 p_0$ have x = 1.


Q: How many answers y = 1 should we get, on average?




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Q: How many answers y = 1 should we get, on average?

A:
$$E\{y\} = p_0 \cdot (1-p) + (1-p_0) \cdot p$$



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You can also see this using the law of total probability:

 $E\{y\} = \Pr(y = 1) = \Pr(y = 1 | x = 0) \Pr(x = 0) + \Pr(y = 1 | x = 1) \Pr(x = 1)$

- Therefore, the analyst can estimate $E\{y\}$ empirically using the reported values (let this be \overline{y}), and then compute p_0 by solving $\overline{y} = p_0 \cdot (1-p) + (1-p_0) \cdot p$.
- This gives us an estimator for p_0 :

$$\hat{p}_0 = \frac{\bar{y} - p}{1 - 2p}$$

Q: Can this gives us a negative estimate? Why?

A:
$$E\{y\} = p_0 \cdot (1-p) + (1-p_0) \cdot p$$

$$x = 0$$

$$x = 1$$

$$y = 0$$

$$y = 1$$

$$y = 1$$

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
A: It can happen, this will only approach the true percentage as $n \to \infty$.

Statistical analysis with RR: exercise

- Disclaimer: you have \(\epsilon = 1.1\) (high-ish privacy); no matter what you report in this exercise, you can always claim it was not your true answer (plausible deniability).
- Let's learn how many of you cheated in an exam/assignment before/after covid times.

Statistical analysis with RR: exercise


• x = 1 means "I have cheated". Flip two coins, run randomized response:



	During covid	After covid
Number of participants		
Number of $y = 1$		
Empirical avg: \bar{y}		
Estimate of non-cheaters: $\hat{p}_0 = 1.5 - 2\bar{y}$		
Estimate of cheaters: $\hat{p}_1 = 2\bar{y} - 0.5$		

General Discrete Mechanisms

- A general mechanism that takes inputs and outputs from discrete sets can be written in matrix form by listing its inputs as rows, and its outputs as columns
 - this is similar to how we wrote mechanism when we talked about statistical inference attacks




	<i>y</i> ₁	<i>y</i> ₂	 ${\mathcal Y}_m$
<i>x</i> ₁			
<i>x</i> ₂		$\Pr(y_2 x_2)$	
x _n			

you get the idea...

General Discrete Mechanisms

- Computing ϵ for a mechanism in matrix form is very easy!
- 1. For every column (output), take the largest value and divide it by the smallest
 - This is computing $\max_{x,x'} \Pr(y|x) / \Pr(y|x')$ for a given y.
- 2. Take the largest one of those ratios
 - This value is \leq than any $\Pr(y|x) / \Pr(y|x')$
- 3. Compute the natural logarithm of this, and this will give you ϵ .
 - Since ϵ is the value such that

$$\frac{\Pr(y|x)}{\Pr(y|x')} \le e^{\epsilon}$$



General Discrete Mechanism: example

Q: Alice uses the generalized randomized response to report a differentially private version of her location to a location-based service provider. Her possible locations are points of interest $\{x_1, x_2, ..., x_n\}$. The mechanism reports her real location with probability p and any other location with probability q.

- What is the ϵ -DP level this provides? (note that it will be dependent on p and n).
- You can assume p > 1/n.
- You should check that, when setting n = 2, you get the same formula for ϵ as for the RR mechanism.

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A:
$$q = \frac{1-p}{n-1}$$
. Since $p > \frac{1}{n}$, then $p > q$, and the maximum ratio for any output will be

$$\frac{p}{q} = \frac{p(n-1)}{1-p} \rightarrow \epsilon = \log\left(\frac{p(n-1)}{1-p}\right)$$
When $n = 2$, we are back to randomized response!

Exponential Mechanism

- Sometimes, adding Laplacian noise could destroy the utility of a mechanism.
 - What if we want noise that is not symmetrical?
- Sometimes, we do not want to make numerical answers private, but we want to be able to report objects/classes/categories.
 - How do we do this privately?
- The exponential mechanism can be used to provide DP in many settings.
- The idea is that we will report an output privately, but with a probability *proportional to its utility*.

Private Auction: noise is not great for DP!

- v₁=\$1 $v_2 = 1$
- A set of users wants to buy an item, and each has a private amount they are willing to pay: v_i.
- The retailer sees the v_i 's and could choose the largest price p that maximizes the revenue (number of clients with $v_i \ge p$, times p).
- However, the *p* chosen this way would reveal information about the users' valuations v_i, which can be privacy-sensitive.

Private Auction: noise is not great for DP!

 $v_3 = 3.01$

*\v*₁=\$1

 $v_2 = 1$

Issue here: the revenue (utility) is very sensitive to the choice of p:

- If p = 1, then the revenue is \$3
- If p = 1.01, then the revenue drops to \$1.01
- If p = 3.01, then the revenue is \$3.01
- But at p = 3.02, the revenue drops to \$0 Adding noise to p before making it public can destroy the utility (revenue)

The Exponential Mechanism

Given a database $D \in \mathcal{D}$, a set of outputs \mathcal{H} and a score function $s: \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{H} \to \mathbb{R}$, the **exponential mechanism** M_E chooses an output $h \in \mathcal{H}$ with probability proportional to: $\Pr(M_E(D) = h) \propto \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon \cdot s(D, h)}{2\Delta}\right)$


Here, Δ is the sensitivity of the score function, defined as

$$\Delta = \max_{h} \max_{D,D'} |s(D,h) - s(D',h)|$$

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- In order to compute the actual probability $Pr(M_E(D) = h)$, we need to compute the values of the score function for every $h \in \mathcal{H}$. This can sometimes be very expensive.
- The exponential mechanism chooses items proportional to the score function
- The epsilon smooths this distribution
- The set of outputs is public knowledge, the choice is sensitive



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
in this scenario?

Q: how can we use the exponential mechanism

*v*₃=\$3.01 v₁=\$1 $v_2 = 1$ $\Pr(M_E(D) = h) \propto \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon \cdot s(D, h)}{2\Lambda}\right)$ $\Delta = \max_{h} \max_{D,D'} |s(D,h) - s(D',h)|$


• **Q:** how can we use the exponential mechanism in this scenario?

A: we can discretize the set of possible outputs, e.g., $\mathcal{H} = \{0.1, 0.2, \dots 10\}$ (assuming the maximum price of the item is \$10). This is the set of possible values p. Compute the probability of each and sample with that probability.



Then, the retailer computes s(D, h) for each possible output h. Note that D is simply {v₁, v₂, v₃} in this case.


Q: what will be the sensitivity?




Then, the retailer computes s(D, h) for each possible output h. Note that D is simply {v₁, v₂, v₃} in this case.

Q: what will be the sensitivity?

A: the maximum effect that an item can have in the revenue is \$10, assuming the maximum price of the item is \$10).





• **Q**: Assume $\mathcal{H} = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ compute the probability of selecting each output, when $\epsilon = 1$.

A: sensitivity would be 4

• Scores would be {3,2,3,0}

•
$$\Pr(M_E(D) = 1) = \exp\left(\frac{3}{8}\right) / \Sigma_h \exp\left(\frac{s(D,h)}{8}\right)$$

•
$$\Pr(M_E(D) = 2) = \exp\left(\frac{2}{8}\right) / \Sigma_h \exp\left(\frac{s(D,h)}{8}\right)$$

• $\Pr(M_E(D) = 3) = \exp\left(\frac{3}{8}\right) / \Sigma_h \exp\left(\frac{s(D,h)}{8}\right)$


•
$$\Pr(M_E(D) = 4) = 1 / \Sigma_h \exp(\frac{s(D,h)}{8})$$

•
$$\Sigma_h \exp(\frac{s(D,h)}{8}) = 2\exp\left(\frac{3}{8}\right) + \exp\left(\frac{2}{8}\right) + 1$$

- Assume we want to make a small decision tree for classifying heart attacks based on cholesterol
- Given the following dataset we want to choose a threshold h that maximizes accuracy of the classifier f(c):
 Classifier f(c)

Cholesterol (c)	Heart Attack (y)
216	0
501	1
100	0
535	1
214	1






• Let $s(D, h) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i} (f_h(c_i) = y_i)$



Cholesterol (c)	Heart Attack (y)
216	0
501	1
100	0
535	1
214	1



$$s(D,h) = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i} (f_h(c_i) = y_i)$$

$$\Pr(M_E(D) = h) \propto \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon \cdot s(D, h)}{2\Delta}\right)$$

$$\Delta = \max_{h} \max_{D,D'} |s(D,h) - s(D',h)|$$

• **Q:** Assume $\mathcal{H} = \{100, 200, 300, 400, 500\}$ compute the probability of selecting each output, when $\epsilon = 1.25$.

The Exponential Mechanism - Proof

Prove the exponential mechanism provides ϵ -DP:

- 1. Write the ratio of $Pr(M_E(D) = h)$ and $Pr(M_E(D') = h)$
- 2. Remember these facts:

$$\Pr(M_E(D) = h) \propto \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon \cdot s(D, h)}{2\Delta}\right)$$
$$\Delta = \max_{h} \max_{D, D'} |s(D, h) - s(D', h)|$$

3. Hint: $|s(D,h) - s(D',h)| \le \Delta \rightarrow s(D',h) \le s(D,h) + \Delta$

The Proof

Proof. Fix X, X' as neighbouring datasets, and some outcome $h \in \mathcal{H}$. The we express the ratio of the probability of h being output under X and X' as follows:

$$\begin{split} \frac{\Pr[M_E(X) = h]}{\Pr[M_E(X') = h]} &= \frac{\left(\frac{\exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon s(X,h')}{2\Delta}\right)}{\sum_{h' \in \mathcal{H}} \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon s(X',h')}{2\Delta}\right)}\right)}{\left(\frac{\exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon s(X',h')}{2\Delta}\right)}{\sum_{h' \in \mathcal{H}} \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon s(X',h')}{2\Delta}\right)}\right)} \\ &= \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon(s(X,h) - s(X',h))}{2\Delta}\right) \left(\frac{\sum_{h' \in \mathcal{H}} \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon s(X',h')}{2\Delta}\right)}{\sum_{h' \in \mathcal{H}} \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon s(X,h')}{2\Delta}\right)}\right) \\ &\leq \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{2}\right) \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{2}\right) \left(\frac{\sum_{h' \in \mathcal{H}} \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon s(X,h')}{2\Delta}\right)}{\sum_{h' \in \mathcal{H}} \exp\left(\frac{\varepsilon s(X,h')}{2\Delta}\right)}\right) \\ &= \exp(\varepsilon). \end{split}$$

Source: Gautam Kamath

Just checking...

Given a database $D \in \mathcal{D}$, a set of outputs \mathcal{H} and a score function $s: \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{H} \to \mathbb{R}$, the **exponential mechanism** M_E chooses an output $h \in \mathcal{H}$ with probability proportional to: $\Pr(M_E(D) = h) \propto \exp\left(\frac{\epsilon \cdot s(D, h)}{2\Lambda}\right)$

Q: What is the runtime complexity of the exponential mechanism in relation to \mathcal{H}

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Q: What is the runtime complexity of the exponential mechanism in relation to \mathcal{H}

A: $O(|\mathcal{H}|)$

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Q: What is the effect of reducing epsilon on the probability of each item?

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Q: What is the effect of reducing epsilon on the probability of each item?

A: The probabilities become more similar. As epsilon tends to 0, probabilities tend to $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|}$

The Exponential Mechanism is Generic!

Q: What is the probability of selection when the score function is s(D, h) = -|f(D) - h|

The Exponential Mechanism is Generic!


Q: What is the probability of selection when the score function is s(D, h) = -|f(D) - h|

Q: What distribution is this?

A:
$$\propto \exp\left(-\frac{\epsilon|f(D)-h|}{2\Delta}\right)$$

The Exponential Mechanism is Generic!

Q: What is the probability of selection when the score function is s(D, h) = -|f(D) - h|



Q: What distribution is this?

A: Even the Laplace mechanism is an instantiation of the exponential mechanism!

The Gaussian Mechanism

- So far, we have seen mechanisms for pure DP. Let's see one for approximate DP.
- First, given a function $f: \mathcal{D} \to \mathbb{R}^k$, we define the ℓ_2 -sensitivity as:

$$\Delta_2 \doteq \max_{D,D'} ||f(D) - f(D')||_2$$

The Gaussian Mechanism

• Given a function $f: \mathcal{D} \to \mathbb{R}^k$, we define the ℓ_2 -sensitivity as:

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• The Gaussian mechanism simply adds Gaussian noise to the output of the function:

Given a function $f: \mathcal{D} \to \mathbb{R}^k$ with ℓ_2 -sensitivity Δ_2 , the **Gaussian mechanism** is defined as $M(D) = f(D) + (Y_1, Y_2, ..., Y_k)$ where each Y_i is independently distributed as $Y_i \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ with $\sigma^2 = 2 \ln \left(\frac{1.25}{\delta}\right) \Delta_2^2 / \epsilon^2$.

The Gaussian Mechanism

• Given a function $f: \mathcal{D} \to \mathbb{R}^k$, we define the ℓ_2 -sensitivity as:

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The Gaussian mechanism
$$M(D) = f(D) + Y$$
 where $Y \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$
with $\sigma^2 = 2 \ln \left(\frac{1.25}{\delta}\right) \Delta_2^2 / \epsilon^2$ provides (ϵ, δ) -DP.

Q: does the relationship between the privacy parameter ϵ and the noise variance σ^2 make sense?

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Q: does the relationship between the privacy parameter ϵ and the noise variance σ^2 make sense?

A: yes, to provide more privacy (lower ϵ) we need more noise (higher σ^2).

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Q: if we fix the noise level (σ), what is the relationship between ϵ and δ , and why?

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Q: if we fix the noise level (σ), what is the relationship between ϵ and δ , and why?


A: for a fixed noise, ϵ and δ will be inversely proportional: if we want allow for a higher δ then that level of noise can provide lower ϵ 's.

The Gaussian mechanism M(D) = f(D) + Y where $Y \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ with $\sigma^2 = 2 \ln \left(\frac{1.25}{\delta}\right) \Delta_2^2 / \epsilon^2$ provides (ϵ, δ) -DP.

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
This is not just for the Gaussian mechanism, but all ϵ , δ -DP mechanisms:



Example 1: *D* contains the salaries of a set of n users. The salaries range from 10k to 200k. We want to release the **total** salary of the users. What is the σ^2 of the gaussian mechanism under bounded DP assuming $\delta = 1/n^2$

$$\Delta_2 \doteq \max_{D,D'} ||f(D) - f(D')||_2$$

$$f(D) + Y \text{ is } (\epsilon, \delta) \text{-DP if}$$
$$Y \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$
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A: sensitivity is 190k

 $\sigma^2 = 2 \ln(1.25 n^2) (190k)^2 / \epsilon^2$


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Example 2: *D* contains the age of a set of users. We want to release the histogram of ages [0-10), [10-20)...[100,110). What is the σ^2 of the gaussian mechanism under bounded DP assuming $\delta = 1/n^2$

$$\Delta_2 \doteq \max_{D,D'} ||f(D) - f(D')||_2$$

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


Example 2: *D* contains the age of a set of users. We want to release the histogram of ages [0-10), [10-20)...[100,110). What is the σ^2 of the gaussian mechanism under bounded DP assuming $\delta = 1/n^2$

A: sensitivity $\sqrt{2}$ in bounded DP $\sigma^2 = 4 \ln(1.25 n^2) / \epsilon^2$

$$\Delta_2 \doteq \max_{D,D'} ||f(D) - f(D')||_2$$

$$f(D) + Y \text{ is } (\epsilon, \delta) \text{-DP if}$$
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
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Properties of DP

Post-processing

Robustness to post-processing: Let $M: \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{Y}$ be an (ϵ, δ) -DP mechanism, and let $F: \mathcal{Y} \to \mathcal{Z}$ be a (possibly randomized) mapping. Then, $F \circ M$ is (ϵ, δ) -DP.

- In layman terms, once you get a "privatized output" (Y) you cannot "unprivatize it" by running another mechanism.
- This makes a lot of sense: otherwise, the adversary could simply design an *F* that could "unprivatize" *M*!!



It is **very important** that *F* does no depend on *D* (other than through *Y*) at all! Otherwise, this will not hold!

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- Group privacy refers, in the central DP setting, to consider datasets that differ in more than one entry (this could be for the bounded or unbounded notion of DP).
- Let's see it first for pure ϵ -DP

Group privacy: Let $M: \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}$ be a mechanism that provides ϵ -DP for D, D' that differ in one entry. Then, it provides $k\epsilon$ -DP for datasets D, D' that differ in k entries.

Group privacy: Let $M: \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}$ be a mechanism that provides ϵ -DP for D, D'that differ in one entry. Then, it provides $k\epsilon$ -DP for datasets D, D' that differ in entries.

If this is ϵ -DP.... ... then this is 2ϵ -DP $\xrightarrow{D} \xrightarrow{R} \xrightarrow{\operatorname{Pr}()}$ $\underbrace{\overset{D}{\Longrightarrow} \overset{R}{\longrightarrow} \overset{\operatorname{Pr}(\iota)}{\longrightarrow} }_{R}$

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<u></u>

Group privacy: Let $M: \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}$ be a mechanism that provides ϵ -DP for D, D' that differ in one entry. Then, it provides $k\epsilon$ -DP for datasets D, D' that differ in k entries.

Q: How do we prove this?

Group privacy: Let $M: \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}$ be a mechanism that provides ϵ -DP for D, D' that differ in one entry. Then, it provides $k\epsilon$ -DP for datasets D, D' that differ in k entries.

Q: How do we prove this?

A: We build a sequence of k - 1 intermediate datasets that differ in one entry from the previous and next one, connecting D and $D': D \to D_1 \to D_2 \to \cdots \to D'$. Then, we apply the definition of DP k times:

 $\Pr(M(D) \in S) \le \Pr(M(D_1) \in S) e^{\epsilon} \le \Pr(M(D_2) \in S) e^{2\epsilon} \le \dots \le \Pr(M(D') \in S) e^{k\epsilon}$

Group privacy with (ϵ, δ) -DP

• For approximate DP, δ gets an additional factor of $ke^{(k-1)\epsilon}$:

Group privacy: Let $M: \mathcal{D} \to \mathcal{R}$ be a mechanism that provides (ϵ, δ) -DP for D, D' that differ in one entry. Then, it provides $(k\epsilon, ke^{(k-1)\epsilon}\delta)$ -DP for datasets D, D' that differ in k entries.

Sequential Composition

Naïve composition: Let $M = (M_1, M_2, ..., M_k)$ be a sequence of mechanisms, where M_i is (ϵ_i, δ_i) -DP. Then M is $(\sum_{i=1}^k \epsilon_i, \sum_{i=1}^k \delta_i)$ -DP

- This means that running k mechanisms on the same sensitive dataset, and publishing all k results, the ϵ s and δ s add up (privacy decrease as we publish more results).
- Recall, the attacks we saw in lecture 14...
 - More queries meant more leakage... this captures that.

Sequential Composition


• However, if we allow the overall δ to be slightly larger, we can get a much smaller ϵ :

Advanced composition: Let $M = (M_1, M_2, ..., M_k)$ be a sequence of mechanisms, where M_i is (ϵ, δ) -DP. Then M is $\left(\epsilon \sqrt{2k \cdot \ln\left(\frac{1}{\delta'}\right)} + \frac{k\epsilon(e^{\epsilon}-1)}{e^{\epsilon}+1}, k\delta + \delta'\right)$ -DP

• Note that the overall ϵ only grows on the order of \sqrt{k} now (loosely speaking), and that if we allow higher δ' then we can get a smaller overall ϵ .

Parallel Composition

Parallel Composition: Let $M = (M_1, M_2, ..., M_k)$ be sequence of mechanisms, where M_i is ϵ_i -DP. Let $D_1, D_2, ..., D_k$ let a deterministic partition of D. Publishing $M_1(D_1), M_2(D_2), ..., M_k(D_k)$ satisfies $(\max_{i \in [1, ..., k]} \epsilon_i)$ -DP.



Other notions of DP

Many other variations...

(D, t, ε) -per-instance DP [162]	$(\Theta, \varepsilon, \delta)$ -active PK DP [11, 14, 35]
$(\mathcal{R}, \varepsilon)$ -generic DP [105]	$(\Theta, \varepsilon, \delta)$ -passive PK DP [35]
$(G, \mathcal{I}_Q, \varepsilon)$ -blowfish Pr [84, 86]	$(\Theta, \Phi, \varepsilon)$ -pufferfish Pr [106]
ε -adjacency-relation div. DP [97]	$(\Theta, \varepsilon, \delta)$ -distribution Pr [98]
Ψ -personalized DP [59, 76, 94, 118]	(d, Θ, ε) -extended DnPr [98]
Ψ -tailored DP/ $\varepsilon(\cdot)$ -outlier Pr [120]	(f, Θ, ε) -divergence DnPr [97]
$(\pi, \gamma, \varepsilon)$ -random DP [83]	$(d, f, \Theta, \varepsilon)$ -ext. div. DnPr [97]
$d_{\mathcal{D}}$ -Pr [22]	(Θ, ε) -positive membership Pr [114]
(ε, γ) -distributional Pr [141, 177]	$(\Theta, \varepsilon, \delta)$ -adversarial Pr [139]
$(\varepsilon(\cdot), \delta(\cdot))$ -endogenous DP [107]	$(\Theta,\varepsilon)\text{-aposteriori}$ noiseless Pr [14]
$(d_{\mathcal{D}}, \varepsilon, \delta)$ -pseudo-metric DP [36]	ε -semantic Pr [69, 96]
$(\theta, \varepsilon, \gamma, \delta)$ -typical Pr [10]	(Agg, ε) -zero-knowledge Pr [72]
(Θ, ε) -on average KL Pr [164]	$(\Theta, \Gamma, \varepsilon)$ -coupled-worlds Pr [11]
(f, d, ε) -extended divergence DP [97]	$(\Theta, \Gamma, \varepsilon, \delta)$ -inference-based CW Pr [11]
(\mathcal{R}, M) -general DP [103]	ε_{κ} -SIM-computational DP [129]
(Θ, ε) -noiseless Pr [14, 44]	ε_{κ} -IND-computational DP [129]
(Θ, ε) -distributional DP [11, 35]	(Agg, ε) -computational ZK Pr [72]

Name & references	
(ε, δ) -approximate DP [52]	
$(\varepsilon,\delta)\text{-probabilistic DP}$ [20, 124, 127]	
ε -Kullback-Leiber Pr [9, 31]	
$(lpha, \varepsilon)$ -Rényi DP [128]	
ε -mutual-information DP [31]	
(μ, τ) -mean concentrated DP [58]	
(ξ, ρ) -zero concentrated DP [19]	
(f, ε) -divergence DP [9]	
ε -unbounded DP [105]	
ε -bounded/attribute/bit DP [105]	
(c, ε) -group DP [49]	
ε -free lunch Pr [105]	
(R, c, ε) -dependent DP [116]	
(P, ε) -one-sided DP [42]	
(D, ε) -individual DP [149]	

An SOK from

2020

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Renyi Differential Privacy

- Differential privacy is a very ambitious privacy guarantee, that protects against a worst-case adversary that potentially knows *D* and *D*', and for all possible outputs of the mechanism.
- ϵ and δ provided a very limited and pessimistic description of the differences between $Pr(M(D) \in S)$ and $Pr(M(D') \in S)$.
- There are other *relaxed* notions of DP that capture other nuances between these distributions.
 - A popular one is **Renyi Differential Privacy**
 - We will see more about this in the ML lectures.